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From the point of view of establishing hegemony—or from that of breaking out of it—the key elements of the world-view that need to be manipulated are three: man's view of nature, man's view of the social world—using the word "social" in its comprehensive sense to cover all of man's relations with his fellow men—and man's view of man himself.

It is quite obvious that man's conduct *vis-a-vis* nature will be different if he has internalized the view that the natural, empirical world, the world of wood and stone, just does not exist, than if he has internalized the view that, while it does exist, it is subject to unknowable and capricious laws. His conduct would differ even more if the view he has internalized is neither of the above but the view that the laws are knowable though uncontrollable or the view that the laws are both knowable as well as manipulable or the view that not only are the laws knowable and manipulable, but that they can be used by man to autonomously create relationships (whether these be alloys or engineered genes) that do not exist in nature at all.

Similarly, man's conduct would be very different if he recognizes the social world for what it is—a man-made social world—than if he views it as being an aspect of nature itself, as embodying eternal relationships that are beyond his control, relationships that have a superhuman sanction, a divine legitimacy.

Nor need we argue at length that man's conduct *vis-a-vis* nature as well as the social world will be affected by his view of himself. He is unlikely to use his creative potential to mould and smash and remould either nature or the social world if he has convinced himself that he is an inadequate, puny, subordinate, isolated being; he is liable to do even less about the world around him if he has convinced himself that he is an abstraction, that he is not the empirical being of flesh and blood but an undefinable, noncorporeal "essence."

These aspects of the consciousness of a people can be gleaned in many ways. We may, for instance, glean them in the rituals—social and religious—a people live by. We may glean them in the popular literature—the myths and legends, the folk-tales—of a people.

They can be seen, as if in a crystal, in the philosophical tradition of a people. For philosophy is, as Marx notes in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, nothing but religion—and, in a sense, life itself—rendered into thoughts and thinkingly expounded.

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